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Understanding Organisational Creativity: Insights from Pragmatism 
Diane-Laure Arjaliès, Philippe Lorino and Barbara Simpson 
I am told I am creative—I don’t know what that means … I just keep on 
plodding …  
Peter Drucker quoted in 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996: 14) 
Introduction 
Creativity is arguably one of the most crucial features of organisation as it infuses and 
influences all epistemic practices (Cook and Brown 1999). From an evolutionary perspective, 
creativity may be understood as the source of novelty in key organisational change processes 
such as product and process innovations, strategic renewals, restructurings, identity 
reconstruals, and market reorientations. Thus interest in creativity is by no means limited to the 
so-called creative industries since every organisation is inevitably at some time faced with 
imperatives to change. However, creativity remains significantly under-researched (Joas 1996, 
Sternberg and Lubart 1999, Hennessey and Amabile 2010), leaving many unanswered questions 
about its antecedents, the conditions in which it flourishes or is inhibited, and the social 
processes by means of which it emerges. 
In this chapter we propose that American pragmatism, especially the works of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, offers a potentially fruitful way of 
understanding creative practice as a dynamic social process. From this viewpoint, creativity is 
the human condition (Joas 1996) that exists as a potential in even the most mundane, everyday 
plodding actions of social practice (Kilpinen 1998). It begs a dynamic, real-time theorisation 
that can address how questions by accommodating the temporal aspects of social practice 
(Tsoukas and Chia 2002). We develop our argument by drawing on an empirical example that 
demonstrates the temporal emergence of creative practice in a small financial services company. 
We show that creativity cannot be explained simply in terms of the application of planned 
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techniques and formulae (Bohm 1996). Rather, it arises as a response to uncertain and 
unanticipated situations that call out changeful actions. 
Researching Creativity 
Existing research on creativity is characterised by a huge diversity of disciplinary interests in 
design and performance, spanning the entirety of the arts and sciences. Of particular relevance 
to organisational scholars, creativity has been explored in both the psychological and 
sociological literatures. On one hand, critics of developments in the psychology literature point 
to the somewhat fragmented state of creativity research (Simonton 2003; Hennessey and 
Amabile 2010), and call for an integrative mechanism to draw the creative person, the creative 
product, and the creative process together in a contextualised and dynamic theoretical frame. On 
the other hand, in a comprehensive review of the classical writers in sociology, Joas (1996) 
concluded that none of these has succeeded in smoothly integrating a theory of creativity into 
their thinking, thus condemning creativity to remain ever an externality in social theory. 
Attempts to overcome these problems have drawn on systemic, or ecological, 
understandings of human activity. For instance, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) argued that creativity 
arises in the interaction between individuals and their sociocultural contexts, in what Woodman, 
Sawyer and Griffin (1993) independently characterised as an interactionist view of creativity. 
However, these models do not explain how contexts influence behaviours, nor how creative 
behaviours at an individual level can be joined together to comprise group or organisation level 
creativity. Hargadon and Bechky (2006) challenged the dualistic separation between individual 
and collective levels of analysis, adopting instead a relational perspective that focuses on 
interpersonal interactions and their potential to produce ‘moments of collective creativity’ 
(2006: 484). They proposed a model that used collective mind (Weick and Roberts 1993) to 
describe the triggering of collective creativity through interpersonal interactions. Their interest 
in mind and cognition, however, creates an inappropriately individualistic focus that leaves 
much of the communicative potential of interpersonal interactions unexamined. 
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The pragmatists were trenchant in their opposition to the dualistic distinctions evident in 
much of this work on creativity. Dewey in particular railed against the separation of mind and 
body (thinking and feeling), arguing that although these are two different aspects of the process 
of living, by separating them into discrete conceptual categories, we effectively cut across the 
very practices that we seek to understand (Simpson 2009). In contrast to more rationalistic 
philosophies, the pragmatists understood human experience and conduct in practical, everyday 
terms wherein we are all active participants, rather than mere spectators, in the construction of 
social meanings (Bernstein 1972). From their perspective, the key to creativity is abduction, a 
process that generates creative insight by forming hypotheses to explain problematic situations 
(Peirce 1965). Abduction broadens the scope of experience mobilised in any given situation 
from habitual to less habitual forms of action, integrating emotional and rational judgments to 
overcome the classical dichotomy between ‘creative thinking’ and ‘rational thinking’. 
However, a comprehensive understanding of creative action in organisations requires 
more than abduction alone. Drawing on the wider pragmatist canon, we argue firstly that 
abduction arises when habits of action are disrupted by unanticipated events, prompting a 
process of inquiry that seeks to transform experience and reinstate action (Dewey 1938 (1986)). 
Secondly, this creative process is inherently social and conversational (Mead 1934). To avoid 
possible confusion with ‘interactionist’ theories such as those mentioned above, we follow 
Dewey and Bentley (1949 (1991)) who made a distinction between interactions and 
transactions. They saw these as two different levels of inquiry: an interaction is something that 
happens between actors who are physically and mentally independent, while a transaction 
happens across actors who are aspects of a relationally integrated whole; whereas meanings are 
transmitted between actors in an interaction, the actors are the continuously emerging meaning 
in a transaction. Both selves and situations are continuously reconstructed in transactional 
processes (Elkjaer and Simpson 2011). Further, this process of transactional meaning-making is 




In our view, these pragmatist themes of abduction, habit, inquiry, transactional meaning-
making and semiotic mediation are all necessary components of a theory of organisational 
creativity that is both social and dynamic. In the empirical example that now follows, we will 
elaborate these themes and demonstrate the interplay between them as the managers of a 
troubled company seek creative ways of regaining competitiveness in an increasingly 
challenging market. We hope, in this way, to offer a more complex and subtle understanding of 
the creativity inherent in everyday organisational practices. 
Innovation in a Financial Services Company 
This example concerns X Corporation,1 a small French asset management company that 
specialises in socially responsible investment (SRI) equities, managing funds amounting to €2 
billion. An SRI equity portfolio usually comprises 40 to 50 companies, often the three to five 
best companies – in terms of both financial and SRI performance – in a variety of activity 
sectors (e.g. utilities, banking and insurance). There may be up to 20 different sectors 
represented in any portfolio. For promoters of socially responsible investment, better financial 
performance is achieved in the long term by minimising the costs that result from below-
average performance in social, environmental and governmental domains. However, asset 
management companies find it difficult to achieve optimal financial and SRI performance. It 
was in this context that X Corporation’s senior managers recognised an urgent need to develop 
creative new ways of designing their SRI portfolios. 
Prior to 2007, the SRI equity funds of X Corporation were invested among the Eurostoxx, 
an index representing the 300 largest capitalisations of 12 Euro zone countries. A quarterly SRI 
ranking of the companies in each sector was calculated by X Corporation’s SRI analysts to 
inform investment decisions made by its asset managers. The method of calculating this SRI 
ranking was very simple, and had not changed since 1998: an external social rating agency 
would provide company scores based on more than 100 different criteria, such as carbon 
emissions, board independence, mix of energy sources, human resource management practices, 
                                                 
1 X Corporation is a pseudonym. 
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and so on; these were then used by X Corporation’s SRI analysts to assign a weighted average 
SRI grade between 0 and 100 for each company. Asset managers then followed the so-called 
‘best-in-class’ approach: in each sector, they favoured companies with the best SRI grade 
relative to their peers. To maintain good financial performance, assets needed to be invested in 
different sectors so that if one particular sector suffered, other sectors could compensate for the 
loss. A monthly SRI grade was given to each portfolio – this consisted of assessing the weighted 
average SRI grades of companies present in the portfolio. Within X Corporation, it was 
mandatory for each portfolio to achieve an average SRI score greater than 50/100. In the event 
that this requisite grade was not achieved, the portfolio manager would be required to change 
the content of his/her portfolio for the following month. In practice, though, no such 
requirement was ever exercised. 
The data for this example are drawn from a three-year ethnographic study that combined 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews (conducted with all the members one year 
after the systems redesign) and documentary evidence. One of the authors was present in the 
company for the year during which the investment decision systems were redesigned, and 
participated in all the meetings of the working group as an SRI analyst. Being full-time inside 
the company, she also attended informal discussions between the different members. Hundreds 
of pages of notes were taken on a daily basis to record the different events occurring at X 
Corporation. Emails, minutes of meetings and responses to invitations to tender were also 
analysed. Consistent with the pragmatist orientation of this chapter, we have adopted a non-
representational approach to data analysis (Lorino et al. 2011) that focuses on the processual 
and narrative unfolding of an emergent system for evaluating investment choices within X 
Corporation. The following narrative of creative action plays out over five phases throughout 
which, we have explicitly woven pragmatist themes as an explanatory commentary. 
Phase 1: Normal Practice is Disrupted 
The challenge for SRI funds is twofold: (1) to perform well financially; and (2) to be perceived 
as very innovative in terms of SRI. Yet, the most socially responsible companies are not always 
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the most attractive financially speaking, which raises many problems in constructing balanced 
investment portfolios. In August 2007, X Corporation’s SRI funds were judged to be no longer 
competitive by external consultants who act as intermediaries between institutional clients and 
asset management companies. They are paid by clients to select the best asset management 
companies to be invited to tender for shares. Therefore, if an asset management company is not 
chosen by consultants, it has almost no chance of receiving invitations to tender. The concerns 
the consultants raised about X Corporation’s SRI funds were firstly, the form of the SRI 
constraint (a monthly score in excess of 50/100), which was insufficiently discriminating as a 
predictor of performance. Indeed, by combining very good and very bad companies in the same 
portfolio, this grade could mask consistently poor performing stocks. Secondly, the integration 
of SRI criteria in the company selection process was deemed too superficial: according to 
consultants, more companies had to be excluded for SRI reasons only, a criterion known as ‘SRI 
selectivity’. Contrary to the company’s existing SRI grading system, SRI selectivity forces asset 
managers to exclude a minimum percentage of the SRI laggards from the portfolios: in other 
words, SRI leaders cannot be used to compensate for SRI laggards. Thirdly, the company’s SRI 
criteria lacked innovation compared to competitors. As a result, X Corporation was no longer 
able to meet the SRI demands of clients, consultants and competitors in the current market. 
Consequently, its survival was threatened. 
To address this problem, the CEO of X Corporation decided to redesign the company’s 
SRI equity funds. According to him, X Corporation had become a laggard due to its lack of 
innovation, so he established a cross-disciplinary working group comprising representatives of 
the Marketing Department (two sales representatives, responsible for selling the funds), the 
Asset Management Department (two asset managers, responsible for the investment decisions) 
and the SRI Department (three SRI analysts who were responsible for the SRI analysis inside 
the company. Based on the social rating agencies’ information, they advised asset managers 
where to invest and controlled the SRI compliance of portfolios). 
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Post-mortem assessments were no longer useful […] We had to think up new 
attractive products, which meant performance and originality in the 
presentation. The working group was launched for two reasons: we’re cleverer 
when we work as a group and employees needed to appropriate the process. 
[…] It had to be a communal project. That’s how it works best. (CEO) 
The working group planned to meet face-to-face once a week; full-attendance at each meeting 
was compulsory. The agenda was to be set one week in advance so that each member would 
have time to prepare his/her input for the following meeting. Since they were responsible for 
responding to invitations to tender, it was the sales representatives who took the lead in shaping 
the working group activities. They believed that they could explain to SRI analysts and asset 
managers what was lacking in the existing funds and help them to achieve a compromise 
between SRI and financial concerns. 
I tried to reconcile each party’s interests, which were evidently different: SRI 
purists, asset managers without regret, and the Director of Marketing & SRI 
who really wanted to show that the process was, in fact, simple, robust and 
immutable. (Sales Representative) 
Pragmatist Commentary – Prior to this first phase of change at X Corporation, the company 
appeared to be dwelling in a cosy state of complacency regarding its market competitiveness. In 
pragmatist terms, this state equates to ‘habit’. For Peirce (1965: 5.388–410),2 habit refers to a 
learned predisposition to undertake a standard course of action in response to specific 
circumstances, or to attribute a standard meaning to specific events. Dewey further elaborated 
this notion as follows: 
[Habit is] that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and 
in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in 
quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued 
subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. (Dewey 1922 
(1957): 31) 
                                                 
2 Citations to Peirce refer to the Collected Papers, volume number.paragraph number(s) 
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It is habit that allows us to reliably anticipate both our own and others’ conduct in given 
situations by making the future seem predictable. However, although habits express social 
norms of conduct, they are neither rigidly fixed for all time, nor are they ‘Pavlovian’ reflexes. 
Rather, they are dynamically emergent practices that admit the possibilities of mutability and 
change over time through social transactions. The continuing accomplishment of habits depends 
upon the situated interpretation of circumstances. If nothing specific draws actors’ attention in a 
given situation, then habit will prevail as the normal way of doing things. However, when the 
anticipations afforded by habit prove inadequate or inappropriate for the situation, then actors 
may choose to transform their course of action. The interruption of habitual action is a key point 
in pragmatist thinking as it is this that initiates the cycle of inquiry by means of which social 
practices mutate over time. 
In the case of X Corporation, habitual ways of evaluating SRI investment portfolios are 
interrupted in this first phase by external consultants who argue that the company’s products are 
no longer competitive in the changing marketplace. It is this disruption to habitual practice that 
propels the company into the extended process of inquiry, which plays out over the ensuing 
phases of this change story. We see that the CEO’s first action is to establish a working group 
that offers a context for transactional conversations to tackle the seemingly intractable problem 
of restoring competitiveness to the company’s products. 
Phase 2: Making Our Expertise More Visible 
The first meeting of the working group took place in September 2007. Group members did not 
have any shared views about how to tackle the situation, but they did have a shared purpose to 
reinstate the company’s competitiveness. The sales representatives saw the problem as a 
communication gap: X Corporation only needed to prove its expertise; tacit knowledge needed 
to be formally represented and made visible to clients. For this purpose, they asked the SRI and 
Asset Management Departments to design ‘company factsheets’, which would summarise the 
SRI and financial profile of each company in their investment portfolios. In this, they were 
following what they perceived to be a market trend where increasing numbers of competitors 
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were providing such factsheets. After one and half months, the working group reached a 
deadlock: SRI analysts and asset managers were unable to design usable factsheets. Among 
several problems, there were not enough SRI analysts and asset managers to regularly update 
the information provided by the factsheets. Since they were always obsolete, factsheets could 
not be used by asset managers and SRI analysts in their own day-to-day practices. 
The company factsheets were merely for commercial purpose […] We 
completely disagreed. Sales managers really needed them as a commercial 
tool. Whereas, for us [asset managers and SRI analysts], it was rather the 
opposite. It wasn’t a tool, it was pure reporting. And, I must say, reporting 
with very little added-value […] It was completely of secondary importance. 
(Asset Manager) 
It was the worst thing we could have done! It was putting the cart before the 
horse. It was not triggered by the redesign of the process but by the external 
motivation to demonstrate that we had a process which did not exist! (SRI 
Analyst) 
Even today, working on the company factsheets is not easy. Frankly, these 
company factsheets have been a failure. (Director of Marketing &SRI) 
Pragmatist Commentary – In this phase we see the working group’s initial response to the 
change imperative. The sales representatives have offered what seems, on the face of it, a 
plausible account of the problem (tacit knowledge needs to be made visible to clients) and its 
potential resolution (provision of factsheets). The other members of the working group appear, 
at least initially, to accept this position without debate, thus limiting the transactional potential 
that might otherwise have been afforded by working together. 
The process of conjectural thinking that was employed by the sales representatives 
reflects Peirce’s notion of abduction, which he proposed as a third type of inferential reasoning 
(alongside deduction and induction): 
[Abduction] is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for 
induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves 
the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that 
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something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; 
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. (Peirce 1965: 5.171) 
He explained abduction as the process of inventing a hypothesis as a plausible explanation for 
surprising or unexpected events that arise in the social interplay of experience. Peirce defined 
the syllogistic form of abduction as follows: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true. (Peirce 1965: 5.189) 
For example, if a witness looks away during cross-examination (C), we might observe that 
people look away if they feel guilty (A), and therefore conjecture that this witness is guilty. 
Continuing the analogy with criminal justice, Corrington suggested that detective work is more 
about abduction than deduction ‘because it must create a total picture of the crime and read the 
conjectural picture backwards onto the clues assembled’ (1992: 85). Similarly, Czarniawska 
(1999: 21) maintained that the social sciences ‘owe their insights mostly to abduction’ and 
indeed, abduction may be seen threading through all living experience, giving meaning and 
value to all social actions. In the case of X Corporation, this initial abduction proved inadequate 
as the asset managers and SRI analysts became increasingly aware of the limitations of 
factsheets. This outcome represents a second interruption to practice, which triggers a second 
phase of abduction. 
Phase 3: Redesigning the Investment Process 
In October 2007, the working group members realised they were on the wrong track. There 
were more substantive issues than ‘making things explicit’; they realised that they should 
probably provide something else to clients. In other words, they needed to innovate. For this 
purpose, they decided to redesign the investment process for the SRI funds (i.e. the various 
stages through which companies are selected for the portfolio) by working together on a graphic 
representation. This collaboration evolved during the meetings but also between the meetings in 
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an informal way. Members discussed the different problems during coffee breaks, exchanged 
emails, and shared their ideas with each other on a daily basis. 
[Insert Figure 9.1 here] 
They came up with a new process comprising three steps (Figure 9.1): 
1. Step (1) SRI analysts define an ‘investment universe’ comprising all companies in 
which asset managers may invest, and an SRI typology that encompasses the 
different strategies of companies regarding non-financial aspects. 
2. Step (2) portfolios are constructed according to the risk ratios chosen by clients. 
3. Step (3) asset managers select companies based on classical financial quantitative 
studies and controlled for the good performance of funds, including ‘arbitrage’ 
(taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets). 
Comparison of this investment process with competitors’ processes and clients’ and consultants’ 
demands revealed two further problems to be remedied: the asset managers had insufficient 
freedom when investing, and too few companies were excluded for SRI reasons. 
Pragmatist Commentary – In this phase, we see abduction, deduction and induction 
working together in the meaning-making process that the pragmatists called ‘inquiry’. This 
process is central to their understandings of human, social and organisational change. The 
concept was originally proposed by Peirce (1965: 5.358–387) in his model of doubt and belief, 
in which he saw inquiry as a struggle in the face of doubt to attain a state of belief that is 
consistent with experience. In his view, inquiry is undertaken for the exclusive purpose of 
eliminating doubt and attaining belief. Thus any learning, or any new meaning, results from an 
active process of inquiry that is grounded in experience in a given context. It is neither the 
context nor the organism that is intrinsically and positively doubtful. Doubt and belief 
characterise the relationship between the organism, viewed as the locus of habits, and its 
context. Thus belief is an existential state of fitness between habits and context, whereas doubt 
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is a state of unfitness. Inquiry must therefore be understood as an existential, rather than merely 
cognitive, concept. 
Dewey later developed this notion by adding the idea of ‘a situation’: 
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate 
situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified 
whole. (Dewey 1938 (1986): 108) 
For him, a situation is not a single object or event, nor a set of events (Dewey 1938 (1986): 72), 
but the entirety of all conditions under which, and within which, an organism functions at a 
given time. A situation is problematic or indeterminate when it is not intelligible because its 
constituent factors are in disarray. For Dewey then, the aim of inquiry is not the discovery of an 
antecedent fact, but rather the creation, or construction, of a new situation, bringing into being a 
new object of knowledge that did not exist prior to the act of inquiry. There are various 
identifiable phases in an inquiry process, though these do not necessarily follow in any 
prescribed, linear sequence. Still, inquiry is always triggered by existential unease associated 
with an unanticipated situation, which challenges ongoing habits of practice. This disruption is 
not yet a problem: it ‘becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry’ 
(Dewey 1938 (1986): 111). Here, we have seen triggers to inquiry in both Phase 2 and Phase 3 
of the X Corporation story, both of which were then constituted by the working group as 
problems; firstly, ‘our products are competitive, but customers do not know it’, and secondly, 
‘our products are no longer competitive’. In each case the working group then abductively 
proposed a plausible scenario that could explain events (the lack of factsheets; products that are 
insufficiently discriminating). 
With a hypothesis in place, inquiry then moves to testing by means of the deductive 
reasoning of experimentation. Whereas Phase 2 negated the hypothesis that factsheets are the 
correct solution, Phase 3 demonstrates a more inclusive and more comprehensive effort to 
develop testable hypotheses that address the interests of all the working group members. The 
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practical testing that then ensues reflects an inductive form of reasoning. Through this process, 
the members of the working group have themselves changed by coming to a greater awareness 
of the issues and concerns of colleagues in different departments, and their practices change 
accordingly. However, the conclusion of inquiry is always tentative and fallible, so we see there 
are still unsolved problems at the end of Phase 3, which trigger yet another cycle of inquiry. 
The epistemology of inquiry contrasts with more familiar epistemologies of observation 
and correspondence. In the latter ‘knowing’ means observing a situation from outside in order to 
represent it as accurately as possible, so that it can then guide further action. With pragmatist 
inquiry, however, knowledge is intelligent action, intelligent action is knowledge, and the 
synthesis of knowledge and active experience is the inquiry. Learning then is the embodied and 
situated construction of meaningful experience rather than the production of ‘true’ 
representations in suspended time. Thus the concept of inquiry is a key tool in transcending 
dualistic separations between knowledge and action, decision and execution, design and 
utilization. 
Phase 4: Interacting to Transform Practice 
The main challenge for the working group was to meet the objectives of all three departments. 
However, SRI criteria and financial performance often contradicted each other, and asset 
managers and SRI analysts did not always understand business demands. To help them work 
through these challenges, they set up a white board for each member to physically transform the 
representation of the investment process shown in Figure 9.1. Over the course of a few weeks, 
the working group attempted to develop the three stages of the investment process. Arrows were 
added, new stages appeared, others disappeared, names changed and so on. Each actor reacted 
to the proposed changes from his/her perspective. By November 2007, they had come up with a 
new diagram upon which they all agreed (Figure 9.2). 
[Insert Figure 9. 2 here] 
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The main change in this revised investment process was the addition of a fourth step 
concerning shareholder activism (i.e. the use of equity stakes at a European level in 
collaboration with other asset managers to put public pressure on the company’s management – 
referred to in Step 4 of Figure 9.2 as ‘preferential voting’). However, this new investment 
process still did not solve the problems. Indeed, the first three steps had hardly changed. Further 
work was required and the working group decided to continue transforming the process. 
Throughout, there was a constant iteration between reasoning and experimenting, as one of the 
sales representatives explained: 
The problem was that we needed to sell the funds as we created them. This led 
to many tensions in the working group, notably in terms of timing. We 
submitted the presentation to a prospect one day, and the following day, we 
had to redesign the process […] Each time I came back with new questions we 
needed to answer. (Sales Manager) 
Working group members started to become discouraged by these additional demands and by the 
lack of closure in their project. 
There came a moment when I felt worried because I could sense lassitude; this 
happened at the end of the first term of 2008. I saw that guys were dragging 
their feet, that some of them no longer wanted to attend meetings. We no 
longer knew what to do: one day, we did one thing, the next day, another […] 
To my mind, we were steering off course, although we did finally get back on 
track. (Director of Sales & SRI) 
However, the global financial crisis which had started just a few months earlier, perhaps 
surprisingly, provided a good incentive to continue the redesign process: the working group 
members found themselves with more time available for this task. Indeed, asset managers could 
barely invest (no buy, no sell to avoid financial losses) and the asset management company was 
almost ‘frozen’. The transformed investment process was submitted to consultants and clients 




When you provide an asset manager with a ranking, he/she tells you that there 
is a problem. So it makes you study the ranking. In doing so, you identify 
other problems in the analysis, though it was not your first purpose. You 
shouldn’t have found this mistake. But, by solving one problem, you created 
another one. (SRI analyst) 
Gradually, the goals of the three departments converged. In January 2008, the working group 
produced a new 6-step investment process (Figure 9.3). SRI analysts and asset managers agreed 
on the idea that SRI may be a means to select the most promising companies in the long term – 
financially speaking – whereas they first thought these objectives were contradictory. To 
achieve this compromise between SRI and financial performance, they decided to build a 
common analysis of companies based both on financial and SRI criteria. They worked on new 
SRI criteria they deemed essential for business reasons. 
[Insert Figure 9. 3 here] 
Whereas SRI analysis had previously preceded financial analysis, companies were now 
ranked using a decision matrix (Figure 9.4) that simultaneously took into account both the SRI 
and financial rankings. Since the SRI ranking had been redesigned according to the needs of 
asset managers, there were fewer contradictions between the two rankings. SRI selectivity (i.e. 
the acceptable proportion of ‘SRI laggards’) was set at 50 per cent of the investment universe. 
This meant that the lowest 50 per cent (in SRI terms) of the companies in each activity sector 
were to be excluded from the portfolio. Companies with the best SRI and financial profile 
would be overrepresented in the portfolio compared to their benchmark index. Companies with 
an excellent SRI profile but a very poor financial profile, or vice versa, would be excluded as 
‘laggards’. Other companies would be selected according to their SRI and financial profile. 
[Insert Figure 9. 4 here] 
Pragmatist Commentary – In this phase, we see the escalation of cycles of inquiry, where 
the problems arising from each solution immediately stimulated a new episode. But there is 
more yet to understand about inquiry, as it is a process that is mediated by language, routines, 
16 
 
drawings, tools and other signs. Semiotic mediation has strong foundations in pragmatist 
thinking, especially Peirce’s seminal work on the interpretation of signs (Peirce 1965: 2.227–
273), where he argued that the meaning of a sign is determined by the situated context of its use. 
As such, this meaning is always evolving through usage. Semiotic mediations allow historic 
memory, action rehearsal and creative imagination, by making present in inquiry elements that 
are distant in time or space, such as past behaviours or imagined future situations. 
Mead (1934) later proposed that mediations in the form of what he called ‘significant 
symbols’ provide the basis for mutual intelligibility and the social coordination of actions. He 
argued that significant symbols promote the development of reflexivity by allowing us to stand 
in someone else’s shoes to gain a new perspective on events. Significant symbols are 
constructed transactionally, providing narrative objects that are accessible to a community of 
inquirers. Thus they not only mediate, but are also mediated by inquiry, which develops as a 
pluralist controversy between different interpretations of signs. It is the resulting ambiguities 
that admit the possibility of creative insight and learning. Conversely, in the absence of 
significant symbols, conversation is reduced to a series of reflex reactions that cannot produce 
new meanings. In the case of X Corporation, progressive cycles of inquiry produce new 
diagrams, new rules and new procedures, which then mediate further inquiry. The diagrams 
were constructed collectively, so their meanings are shared by everyone in the group. This is not 
to suggest, however, that every group member has an identical interpretation of the diagrams. 
Each member brings a different experience to situate their interpretation of the diagrams, and 
indeed, it is the exploration of differences between their interpretations that opens up 
possibilities for new thinking. 
Phase 5: Towards Closure 
In January 2008, the investment process had been redesigned ‘on paper’, but had not yet been 
fully implemented. The working group first decided to conduct ‘back-testing’ (i.e. testing the 
new investment process on fictitious portfolios). As this was a first time methodological 
experience, they faced a number of unexpected problems (e.g. the choice of software or the 
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selection of technical constraints), which prolonged the back-testing beyond what had been 
originally planned. 
The new investment process was finally implemented in May 2008. However, two weeks 
later, the 50 per cent SRI selectivity raised major problems: too many companies still had a 
contradictory SRI and financial profile. The working group then decided to lower SRI 
selectivity to 40 per cent, then to 25 per cent. Consequently, the investment process was less 
constrained in terms of SRI than had originally been anticipated: only 25 per cent of companies 
in each activity sector were excluded for SRI reasons. In July 2008, the working group officially 
finished the task and the new investment process seemed to work in practice. The inquiry was 
concluded when the working group – and more particularly the CEO – judged that the 
investment process was sufficiently transformed to be convincing and commercially effective: 
There comes a moment when you have to stop looking for something else, 
since it’s no longer useful – you don’t find anything further … It’s a bit like 
doing research. But I don’t have to tell you that, do I? There comes a moment 
when you have something that you shouldn’t try to improve. You must go 
with it and then … carry on. (CEO) 
Pragmatist Commentary – Peirce (1965: 5.374–376) argued that inquiry comes to an end when 
the irritation caused by doubt is no longer sufficient to motivate further inquiring action. Here, 
we see that after a period of inductive confirmation of the chosen solution, X Corporation has 
reached a new point of equilibrium, albeit a temporary one, where the company’s desire to 
continue to improve their investment decision-making process has to be tempered by other 
demands in the business. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have argued that pragmatism provides a very practical perspective on 
creativity by locating it in the everyday human practices by means of which people make sense 
of their situations. Using X Corporation as an illustrative example, we have shown that the 
pragmatist ideas of abduction, habit, inquiry, transactional meaning-making and semiotic 
18 
 
mediation are all essential in coming to an understanding of creative action in organisations. 
Although the linear structure of chapter writing has forced us to elaborate each of these ideas in 
turn, we do not intend to suggest that they arise sequentially. Rather, we see them as intimately 
intertwined and mutually constituting. Overall, the case exemplifies an inquiry episode that 
begins with the disruption caused by the consultants’ critique of the company’s performance 
and ends with a return to habitual practice, albeit a different habit from that which was 
originally disrupted. Within this long-term episode which lasted for almost a whole year, there 
are many shorter cycles of abductive inquiry that attest to repeated occurrences of creative 
action embedded within the process of change at X Corporation. Thus we come to an 
understanding of organisational change as a continuous unfolding of creative actions that arise 
as people get on with plodding through their lives together. In this way, pragmatism demystifies 
creativity and suggests productive avenues for further research. 
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